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ABSTRACT
NORA ANNE WATSON: Cost-Benefit Analysis
(Under the direction of Neil Manson)
For the last three decades, there has been a lively debate over the best way for a govem-
approach decisions of environmental policy. Adherents to anthropocentric utilitari
anism - those who believe that actions are right as they tend to promote utility for humans -
favor the use of cost-benefit analysis - a tool that is used to come up with recommendations
the basis of their probable costs and
ment to
for or against particular environmental policies
benefits. Although making decisions this way may seem like a straightforward approach
that should be acceptable to everyone, many challenge the latent assumptions of the tool s
application: that only humans have moral standing and that the morality of actions is a
function of the utility they promote. After giving an introduction to CBA, I will articulate
a variety of objections, which will include objections to the methods used in performing a
CBA, objections to CBA’s utilitarian framework, objections from proponents of the Precau
tionary Principle, and objections from advocates of the Land Ethic - a nonanthropocentric
deontological position inspired by the work of Aldo Leopold. Finally, I will give an
ment of CBA in light of these objections. I expect to establish that environmental policy
decisions should be informed by CBA because of the tool’s emphasis on priority setting and
on
assess-
the effective management of funds; however, 1 will also argue that because ot problematic
features of CBA as well as difficulties arising from the ethical system of anthropocentric
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Over the last hundred years, the world population of tigers in the wild has declined
from numbers exceeding 100,000 to an estimated 4,000, Though tigers once thrived from
Turkey to Siberia, only fragmented habitats of their once expansive range remain.'
biology, we know that genetic drift, a mechanism of evolution, results in a loss ot genetic
diversity in small populations. As genetic diversity declines, the ability of the population
to adapt to a changing environment suffers because natural selection has fewer options and,
consequently, can proceed in fewer directions.- Along with other environmental factors,
decreased genetic diversity places a population at a high risk of extinction in the near fu
ture. Within the last century, three of nine tiger subspecies have met this fate. Of the
extant species, all are endangered, and two are listed as critically endangered by the In
ternational Union for Conservation of Nature.'^ Determined to save tigers from imminent
extinction, conservationists remind us that tigers are important in many ways: they serve
top predators, they occupy a special place in the mythology of many cultures, and they
are considered one of the most majestic creatures to be found worldwide.''
Although it may seem obvious that we must do something to protect tigers, this infor
mation alone is powerless to guide our actions. Although science succeeds in describing
' WWF - Local to Global Environmental Conservation,“WWF - Tigers - Population & Distribution,"
http://www.panda.org/what_we_do/endangered _specie.s/endangered_.species_li.st/tigers/tigers-population-distribution
-Douglas J. Futuyma, Evolution. (Sunderland. MA: Sinauer As.sociates. Inc.. 2005), 227.
^The lUCN Red Li.st of Threatened Species, “Panthera tigris,"
http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/15955




the conservation status of tigers with data, those empirical facts, on their own, cannot guide
us to a normative decision.^ Neither a tabulation of tiger population numbers nor a descrip¬
tion of their contributions to ecosystems can, by itself, lead to the conclusion that humans
should invest in more aggressive conservation efforts. Answers to these types of value
questions are instead discovered in philosophy.
The discipline of philosophy spans a diverse collection of questions about the funda
mental nature of the universe, the essence of knowledge, and the properties of a good
human life. Applied ethics is a division of philosophy that is helpful in determining the
moral course of action for situations in the public arena. One branch of applied ethics.
environmental ethics, considers the moral responsibility of humans to the natural world as
well as the moral standing of non-human organisms.^
Within the field of environmental ethics, philosophers disagree about what should be
placed at the center of a system of environmental valuation. Some environmental philoso
phers believe that nature possesses inherent worth and is deserving of moral status apart
from human interests. Among these environmental philosophers, there is disagreement
whether the center of value should be the ecosystem or the individual life-bearer.over
Critics of these systems maintain that giving moral standing to nature is impracticable; fur¬
thermore, they strongly question the foundations of the claim that nature possesses inherent
worth.
Disagreeing with the philosophers who believe in intrinsic environmental value,
''To do so would be to commit the naturalistic fallacy: deriving an "ought" statement, or normative statement,
from an "is" statement, or empirical statement. Another way of saying this is that one cannot derive values
from a set of facts.
^'Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 'Environmental Ethics,"
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/
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some environmental philosophers maintain that a coherent environmental ethic must be an
thropocentric; in other words, the system must regard humanity as the center of value and
the sole beneficiary of moral consideration. Anthropocentrism is the idea that humans are
the most important beings in the natural world. The resulting principal claim is that value
in nature should be human-centered. According to anthropocentrism, nonhuman life as
well as nonliving ecosystem elements should be valued strictly instrumentally. Typically,
anthropocentrists argue that the only practical way to encourage humans to protect the nat
ural world is to show that doing so benefits humanity. Therefore, under an anthropocentric
ethic, mankind has no direct responsibilities to the environment. Critics of anthropocen
trism claim that this perspective is supremacist and inevitably harmful to the natural world."^
In addition to differences over the proper center of value, environmental philosophers
disagree about what determines the rightness or wrongness of actions. Some environmental
philosophers subscribe to utilitarianism, a moral theory most notably formulated by Jeremy
Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism - the view that
actions are right as they tend to promote favorable outcomes and wrong as they tend to pro
mote unfavorable outcomes.^ It is characterized by two central principles: the principle of
utility and the consequentialist principle. The principle of utility says that actions are right
they tend to promote utility and reduce disutility. Utility is typically defined in terms of
happiness and pleasure and disutility in terms of pain and suffering. The consequentialist
principle says that we should judge the morality of an action by the extent to which it brings
as
about desired ends or consequences. Because of this emphasis on the ends or consequences
^Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,“Environmental Ethics,"
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmentai/
'^There are many other forms of con.sequentialism that are different from utilitarianism such as egoism  - the
view that actions are right as they tend to promote favorable consequences for oneself.
4
of an action, utilitarianism is sometimes characterized as a kind of teleological ethics.^
Deontological ethics, most notably associated with Immanuel Kant, is contrary to utili
tarian ethics. Deontological ethics judges moral duty or obligation by an action’s kind and
the motives behind it, not the consequences of the action. Deontologists believe that the
10
For example, if a statement isrightness of an action is independent of its consequences,
false, then for the deontologist, it is wrong to assert it because that would be lying. The
deontologist would make this judgment even if lying would lead to better overall conse
quences than telling the truth. Following Kant, deontologists also think it is imperative that
we never treat things that are intrinsically valuable as merely means to an end. Though Kant
believed that only humans possess intrinsic worth, deontological environmental philoso
phers believe that nature, too, has inherent worth, and so mankind has an obligation to
respect that worth even if the consequences of doing so are inconvenient.
Anthropocentric utilitarianism*” holds that actions are right as they tend to promote
utility for humans. For an example of a patently anthropocentric  utilitarian position, we
turn to Bjorn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical EnvironmentalisU who sets forth a defense
of making environmental decisions with the goal of utility maximization for humans:
II
“People debate and participate in decision-making processes, whereas pen-
‘^Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,“Consequentialism,"
http://plato.stanford.edU/entries/consequentialism/#ClaUti
“^Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo.sophy, “Deontological Ethics,”
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/
"Louis P. Pojman and Paul Pojman, Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application(Belmont,
California: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 62.
'"It is important to point out that there are utilitarian environmental ethics that are nonanthropocentric. For
example. Peter Singer, a philosopher and leader of the Animal Rights movement, gives a defense ot an An
imal Liberation ethic by arguing that animals deserve moral status because ot their sentience - their ability
to experience pleasure and pain. According to Singer, environmental policies that ignore the preferences ot
animals for pleasure and avoidance pain lue guilty ot speciesism - a feeling ot superiority to animals that is
equivalent to raci.sm (Pojman, 2008, 73).
5
guins and pine trees do not. So the extent to which penguins and pine trees are
considered depends in the final instance on some (in democracies more than
half of all) individuals being prepared to act on their behalf. When we are
to evaluate a project, therefore, it depends on the assessment by people. And
while some of these people will definitely choose to value animals and plants
very highly, these plants and animals cannot to any extent be given particular
”13
rights.
Lomborg emphasizes that humans must be the point of reference for environmental
policy decisions because only humans can take part in environmental decision-making.
Nonhuman life, according to Lomborg, should be protected because humanity cannot exist
without nature. It is often in our interest to favor environmental regulations because the
survival of our species depends upon the survival of other species and ecosystems. How
ever, even if certain species are endangered, important to our survival, or simply popular
with humans, we should not, according to Lomborg, confer on them inalienable rights to
protection.
As a tool of anthropocentric utilitarianism, cost-benefit analysis recommends an activity
if the activity’s costs to humans are outweighed by the activity’s benefits to humans and
does not recommend an activity if the reverse is true. To begin our discussion of this
policy tool, I will give a description of how CBA is performed and illustrate its application
with hypothetical examples. I will then provide a short history for the use of CBA by the
United States government, provide modem day examples to show how the tool has shaped
environmental policy, and give arguments in favor of CBA. After explaining CBA, 1 will set
● 'Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist (New York: Cambridge University Press). 12
6
forth several objections to CBA including objections to features of the tool itself, objections
its utilitarian framework, objections from proponents of the Precautionary Principle, and
objections from advocates of the Land Ethic - a nonanthropocentric deontological position
influenced heavily by the work of Aldo Leopold. Finally, after considering these objections,
I will show that although CBA should inform environmental policy, it does not give us all
the information we need to make environmental policy decisions.
to
7
II A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
in How Does CBA Work?
Under CBA, an environmental regulation passes inspection if its benefits to humans
exceed its costs to humans; in other words, CBA establishes whether the benefits of the
Additionally, when there are severalregulation are ’’worth pursuing in light of its costs,
possible courses of action, many formulations of CBA require selecting the option that
maximizes the difference between benefits and costs. The step-by-step process of CBA
first calls for a listing of all potential costs and all potential benefits. Two inputs determine
the number of accounting units assigned to each cost and benefit: the value or utility of
the cost or benefit and the probability that the cost will be incurred or the benefit gained.
These inputs are multiplied to obtain costs and benefits that are weighted by their likelihood
of occurrence. The probability input may be as high as 100 %, but it is often true that the
likelihood of incurring a cost or gaining a benefit is less than 100%. The values of costs and
benefits are largely determined by market values  - what people actually pay, however, when
market values do not exist for particular costs and benefits, market values are approximated
To set all costs and benefits on15by determining people’s hypothetical willingness to pay.
a ’’common temporal footing,” a discount rate is also applied so that costs and benefits in
'●^Jo,seph Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Belmont. Califor
nia: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 60.
’^Cass Sunstein, "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment,"t//?/v£T.v/f\’ oj Chicai>o Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): page
8
16,17
the present have greater value than they have in the future.
Depending on the cost or benefit that is being taken into account, the analyst may be
quite certain of both the value and the probability, uncertain about one or the other, or un
certain about both inputs. A few examples may illustrate these various situations. When
calculating the cost of building supplies for a construction project, the market value of the
materials is known, and it is known that there is  a 100% likelihood that this cost will be
incurred if the project is begun. However, sometimes probabilities that particular benefits
will be gained are difficult to determine; for example, if a potential benefit of reducing de
forestation of tropical rain forest in Brazil were finding a cure for HIV, analysts would be
able to estimate a market value for a cure for HIV but unable to reliably determine the prob
ability of this occurring in a particular area. In addition to uncertain probability, the value
of a benefit may also be difficult to determine. If a certain environmental regulation aims
to curb slash-and-bum agriculture in Madagascar and a potential benefit is the improved
fitness in a population of golden bamboo lemurs*^, the probability that the regulation will
improve the fitness of the lemur population is uncertain, and the value of the benefit is also
difficult to determine because it is likely based on people’s hypothetical willingness to pay
- a measure that is only an approximation of a market value.
After the values of potential costs and benefits are multiplied by their probabilities,
all costs are aggregated, and all benefits are aggregated. If the benefits exceed the costs,
'^Robert Frank, "Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?”  The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000):
For example, suppose we project that some course of action will give a million dollars ot benefit now but
produce two million dollars of cost in the future. The discounting of that cost will depend on how far in the
future that cost lies. If the di.scount rate is high enough, or the cost is far enough into the future, CBA might
yield the result that the benefit outweighs the cost.
Golden bamboo lemurs are a critically endangered species endemic to and found only in Madagascar.
915
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the regulation or activity in question passes CBA’s inspection. To summarize the process,
Frank writes,“The cost-benefit principle says we should install a guardrail on a dangerous
stretch of mountain road if the dollar cost of doing so is less than the implicit dollar value of
the injuries, deaths, and property damage thus prevented,
people believe that the results of the CBA should be treated as one consideration
among others. However, some argue that the results of a CBA are always determinative
of right action because following a course of action when benefits exceed costs leads to a
maximization of net utility for humans - the goal of anthropocentric utilitarianism. For this
reason, these people argue that the correct course of action is always the one that maximizes
the difference between benefits and costs.
We can gain insight into treating CBA as a rule of decision from decision theory
- the body of knowledge concerned with analyzing decision-making  when outcomes are
uncertain. Under decision theory, there are two main elements that inform our decisions:
our beliefs about what will likely occur in the future and our values. The former is ex
pressed in terms of probabilities and the latter is measured in terms of utilities. According
to decision theory, our values are determined by the outcomes we desire, and outcomes that
desirable than others have higher utilities. To evaluate several possible courses of
action, the utility of an outcome from an action can be multiplied by the probability that
the outcome will occur to find the expected value of the action. In deciding upon a course
of action, one option is to apply the expected value rule, which says that one should act
‘‘^Robert Frank, ’’Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000).
m19





so as to maximize expected value.“°’ Those who believe it is irrational to do anything
but always apply the expected value rule are called expected value rule dogmatists. To an
expected value rule dogmatist, CBA is always a clear rule of decision.""
A hypothetical example may further explain how CBA is used to evaluate a proposed
environmental regulation. Suppose that to eliminate the illegal poaching of tigers in the
wild, conservationists attempt to persuade the government of Thailand to fund a campaign
to put an end to the trafficking of tiger parts.  A cost-benefit analyst is hired to calculate the
costs and benefits of the campaign. She considers all the expenses such as those related to
producing educational films, publishing literature, and traveling, and she determines that
the total cost of the campaign is 100 million dollars. Then, by calculating the amount
of money people are willing to pay for a substantial reduction in the illegal poaching of
tigers, she figures that the calculated benefit of the proposal is 30 million dollars. Because
the costs outweigh the benefits, the correct decision, according to a expected value rule
dogmatist, is for the government of Thailand to refuse to fund the campaign.
II.2 History of CBA and Modern Day Examples
To better understand the relevance of CBA to environmental policy decisions, we turn
now to consider the ways in which CBA has applied to environmental problems over the
years and its current standing as a tool of environmental valuation. As early as the 1930s,
the U.S. Corps of Engineers was required to determine if improvements to waterways sys-
-*’lan Hacking, An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic (New York; Cambridge Univeisity Pi ess.
2000,99.
■'There is a debate in decision theory over whether this is the best approach to decision-making.
■■The incommensurability objection dealt with later will shed some light on the debate between expected
value rule dogmatists and those who believe CBA should be one consideration among many.
1 1
23 For much of theterns were worthwhile through a consideration of costs and benefits."
twentieth century, environmentalists favored CBA as a method of valuation because the tool
could account for externalities - consequences of industrial activities that are not counted
as direct costs to the industry or to the consumer.""* To realize the goal of taking all ex
ternal environmental costs into account, the National Policy Act of 1969 mandated a CBA
However, CBA became more25for any federal project having an environmental impact."
controversial as governments began to apply it not only to environmental problems but also
environmental regulations. In 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12291,
which stated, “Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to
to
”26 Under this executive
society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society,
order, all agencies were required to justify regulation by performing a CBA to prove to the
Office of Management and Budget that the benefits to society of the regulation outweighed
the costs to society. Though some believed that this measure would prevent needless spend
ing on environmental protections, others feared that CBA would be manipulated to endorse
deregulation. Most agreed that costs were relevant to policy decisions, but many objected
to using CBA as the central element of environmental policy decision-making. These con
cerns have motivated environmentalists to be skeptical of the use of CBA in environmental
policy decisions.
-^Thayer Watkins, ”An Introduction to Cost Benefit Analysis,” San Jose State University Department of
Economics, http://www,sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/cba.htm.
-■’An example of this is a transaction between an electrical power company that uses coal-fired plants and a
consumer that generates a cost (air pollution) that is born neither by the company nor by the consumer; in
this example, air pollution is an externality.
-''David Schmidtz, ”On the Value and Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis.” in Environmental Ethics; Readings in
Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont. California: Thomson Wadsworth),
page.
-^'U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,” 2.2 Statutory and Administrative Requirements for Economic
Analysis of Regulations,” http://www.epa.gOv/ttnecasl/econdata/Rmanual2/2.2.html.
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A recent Supreme Court case, Entergy Corporation v. EPA~^, epitomizes the ongoing
debate over whether CBA should be used to make decisions about environmental regula
tions. Power plants pull in billions of gallons of water each day from nearby rivers and lakes
for cooling, and, as a result, fish and other aquatic organisms are killed or damaged by be
ing trapped against screens or sucked into the cooling structures."^ Under statute 33 U.S.C.
§ 1326(b) of the Clean Water Act, Congress provided for the protection of aquatic life by
requiring that the cooling water intake structures “reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”"^ Applying CBA to carry out the provisions of
the statute, the EPA found that the aquatic organisms concerned*^® were worth 83 million
dollars, and they compared this figure to the cost of closed-cycle cooling - a technology
that would nearly eliminate harm to aquatic life  - which cost 3.5 billion dollars. Because,
according to the CBA performed, the cost of the closed-cycle cooling system outweighed
the benefit of saving the aquatic life, the EPA determined that closed-cycle cooling systems
should not be required. Objecting to this interpretation of the statute, environmental groups
claimed that Congress had given the EPA no authority to compare costs and benefits in
determining the “best technology available” to protect aquatic life. The argument on the
side of the power plants held that determining what is best requires a comparison of costs
and benefits and that the word minimize does not mean maximally reduce. Challenging
-^This case represents three consolidated cases: PSEG Fossil LLC v. Riverkeeper Incorporated, Utility Water
Act Group V. Riverkeeper Incorporated, and Entergy Corporation v. Riverkeeper Incorporated
■^Adam Liptak,”Ruling by Justices Backs Power Plants,” The New York Times. April, 2. 2009, Washington
section. New York edition.
-"^The Oyez Project, Entergy Corporation i’. EPA  , 556 U.S. (2009),
http://oyez.Org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07.588.
'’’The vast majority of this aquatic life was noncommercial. Because these organisms are not traded, there is
no true market value for them. The 83 million dollar figure was likely a product of a calculation ot people s
hypothetical WTP.
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this view, the environmental groups argued that the EPA never has any authority to weigh
costs against benefits; they insisted that the language of the Clean Water Act clearly re
quires the best technology available, not the best bargain. Expressing a common objection
to the application of CBA to environmental policy decision-making. Justice Souter made
the following observation:
‘*It seems to me that when you're talking about the possible harm from pulling
in a few fish or a few plankton or a few baby clam larvae and so on, as against
the cost conceivably of millions of dollars for extending intake pipes or putting
dealing with such incom-technical expensive filtering mechanisms, you
mensurables that I don’t know how on a site specific basis you would sensibly
are
apply a cost-benefit analysis. Are a thousand plankton worth a million dollars.
” 31I don’t know.
6-3 decision with the ruling that the EPAOn April 1, 2009, the Supreme Court reached a
may use a comparison of costs and benefits to determine what cooling structures should be
used by power plants.-^-
On the other hand, government agencies have used CBA over the years to justify many
environmental regulations such as greater regulation of lead in gasoline, more exacting reg
ulation of lead in drinking water, and stricter requirements of gasoline composition to curb
In the late 1990s, the EPA used cost-benefit analysis to establish a new
'‘The Oyez Project, Oral Argument. Entergy Corporation u EPA , 556 U.S. (2009),
http://oyez.Org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07-588.
'-Adam Liptak,”Ruling by Justices Backs Power Plants,” The New York Times, April. 2. 2009. Washington
section. New York edition.
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regulatory ceiling for arsenic in drinking water. Up until the Clinton Administration, the
standard had been 50 parts per billion (ppb). Research demonstrating the deleterious health
effects of water with a 50 ppb concentration of arsenic - such as increased risks of blad
der and lung cancers - prompted the Clinton Administration to propose a new regulatory
Using CBA, the ERA evaluated several possible standards for arsenic in drink
ing water: 3 ppb*^^, 5 ppb, 10 ppb, and 20 ppb. To calculate benefits, the EPA estimated




consideration non-quantified benefits, resulting from the unknown extent to which particu
lar deleterious health effects result from arsenic levels below 50 ppb.-^^ Benefits were then
converted to dollar amounts by multiplying lives saved by 6.1 million dollars - the value of
a statistical life.-^^ After an analysis of costs and benefits, the EPA selected 10 ppb as the
new regulatory ceiling for arsenic in drinking water.
II.3 Arguments for CBA
One of the major strengths of CBA is that it helps policymakers set priorities. When us
ing CBA, policymakers are able to allocate resources more efficiently as well as determine
whether regulations will be worthwhile. Cass Sunstein writes that by evaluating a regula-
^'*Cass Sunstein, “The Arithmetic of Arsenic.” University of Chicago Law SchoolJohn M. Olin Program in
Law & Economics Working Papers 2 (2001): 16
’“'The EPA identified this as the lowest feasible MCLG, or maximum contaminant level goal.
^^This determination may have been influenced by the precautionary principle - a policy tool that will be
discussed later in this paper.
'^The value of a statistical life, or vsl, is not the same as the value of a lite. The difference is that the vsl
is only meaningful in a risk context; it does not mean that people can or do buy or sell other people tor
6 million dollars. The vsl is calculated by observing what people are willing to be paid to take on lite-
threatening health risks - in other words, market values. Cass Sunstein explains this in the following way:
Imagine that a person must be paid 600 dollars a year extra in salary to take on a I in 10.000 risk. Because
the cost to the company of a person taking on that risk is the statistical value of the person s life multiplied
by the probability, we can easily solve for the vsl to get 6 million dollais.
15
tion by its costs and benefits, it should be possible “to spur the most obviously desirable
regulations, to deter the most obviously undesirable ones, [and] to encourage a broader
view of consequences.”'^* CBA allows several human preferences to be considered and
weighed against each other at once. Advocating a CBA approach to pollution, William
Baxter writes, “Our objective is not pure air or water but rather some optimal state of
In saying this, Baxter does not argue for polluted air and water, but he does
suggest that air and water at the most sensible levels of cleanliness will still contain some
pollutants. Instead of allocating as much money as it takes to purify air and water to the best
of our abilities, Baxter thinks we should balance humanity’s preference for clean air and
water against other human interests so that utility for humans can be maximized. Money
is always limited, so policymakers must be able to make smart decisions about how to
best use money for environmental regulations as well as other concerns. Pointing out the
common sense rational behind CBA, Frank writes, “Scarcity is a simple fact of the human
condition. To have more of one good thing, we must settle for less of another.
A second argument for CBA is that it is grounded in scientific empiricism - a view
that says scientific knowledge can only be gained through experience"^'. The application of
CBA relies upon evidence of probable costs and benefits and does not rest on feelings, in
tuitions, or revelations. For this reason, CBA advocates claim that CBA provides objective
reasons for funding regulation or withholding funds. By disinterestedly looking at
■^Cass Sunstein, “The Arithmetic of Arsenic.” University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin Program in
Law & Economics Working Papers 2 (2001): 11
William Baxter, ’’People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution,” in Environmental Ethics: Read
ings in Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont. California. Thom.son
Wadsworth). 521.
Robert Frank. ’’Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000).
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and benefits, the CBA analyst can provide an objective basis for policymakers to decide
to which good things society should give more financial backing and to which other good
things society should give less financial backing. For example, if it would take billions of
dollars to make drinking water cleaner, evidence that the benefits of the more expensive
purification process outweigh the costs would help policymakers justify allocating money
to this project.
Advocates also point out that CBA conforms to the liberal ideal of personal autonomy.
42
Classical liberal theory says that a society best guarantees individual liberty when its eco-
free markets. Because market prices, wherever they exist, informnomic system is based on
the calculation of WTP, a policy decision based on CBA is often based on what people ac
tually do pay to gain a benefit or avoid a cost. In effect, CBA allows people to vote in favor
of or against a tax. According to CBA advocates, it is wrong for a government to force
people to pay more than their WTP because doing so violates their autonomy. Believing
that CBA allows society to respect individual choices, Sunstein writes, “If regulators reject
people’s actual judgments then they are insulting their dignity.
43
Clive Spash. "How much is that ecosystem in the window?" Environmental Values, 17 (2008): 265
Cass Sunstein. "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment."t/n/irrv/n- of Chicago Law School John M.
Oiin Frof*rani in Law tfe Economics Workiim Papers! (2001): 371
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Ill OBJECTIONS
Although several arguments in favor of CBA exist, CBA is a very controversial policy
tool. Critics of CBA raise several objections to the methods used in calculating benefits,
or people’s willingness to pay; these include objections to the contingent valuation method
and objections to reducing environmental values to monetary values. Other objections take
issue with CBA’s utilitarian grounding and point out the policy tool’s lack of a distribu
tion scheme to promote equality. Because benefits in a CBA are based on willingness to
pay, critics of CBA draw attention to people’s destructive preferences. Believing that CBA
does not offer adequate protection to the environment, many who disapprove of CBA argue
in favor of Precautionary Principle as an alternative; the Precautionary Principle says that
regulations should be put in place if a potential threat is menacing enough even when cause
and-effect relationships between an industry’s activity and damage to the environment are
not established. Other objections come from proponents of the Land Ethic - a nonanthro
pocentric deontological position that is also known as ecocentrism. The Land Ethic, in con
trast to anthropocentric utilitarianism, places the center of value on environmental wholes
After presenting these objections and answers that would
likely follow from an anthropocentric utilitarian, I will give an analysis that explains why
CBA is an extremely useful tool to environmental decision-making  but does not provide us
with all the infomiation we need to make environmental policy decisions.
such as species and ecosystems.
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A flow-chart of objections to CBA.
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IILl Problematic Feature of CBA: The Research Behind the Numbers
When performing a CBA, the analyst researches the amount of money people actually
pay to gain a benefit of some probability or avoid a cost of some probability and uses
this information to determine people’s willingness to pay. Willingness to pay is supposed
to represent all the benefits of an activity after all the benefits have been translated into
dollar amounts and aggregated. However, sometimes it is impossible to determine what
people pay for a good in real-world markets because people do not pay for it at all; market
values do not exist for much of the natural world such as endangered species or biodiverse
When market values do not exist for goods of the natural world, economists44hotspots,
largely rely upon the contingent valuation method, which involves surveying people to find
out what they would be willing to pay in a hypothetical situation."^^ The following example
comes from a survey that was sent to 800 households in the states of Arizona, Colorado,
New Mexico, and Utah to estimate the WTP for protection of nine species of endangered
noncommercial fish. The survey asks people to state their WTP for improvements to the
rivers of the Four Comers Region, which is the critical habitat of the fish.
Suppose a proposal to establish a Four Corners Region Threatened and Endan
gered Fish Trust Fund was on the ballot in the next nationwide election. How
would you vote on this proposal? Remember, by law, the funds could only be
used to improve habitat for fish. If the Four Comers Region Threatened and
every year, would you
Dennis King, "Ecosystem Valuation: Contingent Valuation Method Overview, Ecosystem Valuation,
http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/contingent_valuation.htm.
Cass Sunstein, "Cost Beneht Analysis and the Environment,"^^/?/!’^^//^' of Chicago Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): 358
Endangered Fish would cost your household $.
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vote in favor of it? Circle Yes/ No (King).
For the blank, there were fourteen possible dollar values ranging from $1 to $350, and they
were randomly distributed among the households.
Upon gathering the returned surveys, the average WTP was found to be $195. Once
this value was extrapolated to the entire population of people living in the Four Comers
Region, it was clear that the benefits, represented by the total WTP, greatly exceeded the
of the proposed regulation. Therefore, the results of the CBA recommended that the
Four Comers Region Threatened and Endangered Fish Trust Fund be established for the
preservation of the endangered fish.
costs
Many of the objections leveled against the contingent valuation method focus on the
artificiality of surveys. Critics of the method insist that people’s answers to hypothetical
People, in general, are
47
questions often do not match their behaviors in actual situations,
notoriously bad at estimating. If survey respondents who buy annual gym memberships
are prone to overestimating the amount of time they will spend at the gym by over 70%, ,
they are likely worse at estimating their willingness to pay for the environment. Answers
to hypothetical questions are heavily influenced by the perceived likelihood of the situation
actually happening. If people perceive that the likelihood of actually having to pay is low,
they may greatly exaggerate their WTP; conversely, if people perceive that they will likely
have to pay for regulation, they may understate their WTP.
Dennis King, “’Ecosystem Valuation: Contingent Valuation Method: Case # 4- Economic Value ot Non
commercial Fish,” Ecosystem Valuation, http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/contingent_valuation.htm.
Dennis King, "Ecosystem Valuation: Contingent Valuation Method: Issues and Limitations of the Contin
gent Valuation Method,” Ecosystem Valuation,
http://www.ecosystemvaluation.org/contingent-valuation.htm.






Problems also arise when people fail to answer the specific questions posed by the sur
vey. People may strongly value an environmental good but state that they are willing to pay
little to nothing because they disagree with specific aspects of the regulation proposed.
For example, they may approve of the goal of conserving California condors but disapprove
of higher taxes as a means to the goal. It is also possible that people may decide upon a
dollar amount based on their approval or disapproval of the survey itself. The contingent
valuation method often suffers from non-response bias because those who do not respond
likely have different perspectives from those who do respond, and those perspectives are
not represented in the results of the survey. For all these reasons, critics of the contingent
valuation method worry that answers to hypothetical questions should not be relied upon
in a determination of economic value.
In addition to these concerns, critics point out that people are not accustomed to
thinking about environmental values in monetary terms. Because people do not purchase or
sell beautiful sunsets, pristine beaches, and magnificent redwood forests, it is very difficult
for them to place a price tag on these environmental goods. These difficulties are
pounded by the public’s lack of familiarity with ecological science. Therefore, economists
who rely upon contingent valuation surveys run the risk of basing environmental valuation
on uninformed or misinformed preferences.
CBA advocates admit that surveys have their limitations; however, they contend that
contingent valuation surveys are our best option for valuing environmental goods that lack
market prices. Research can reduce biases within surveys. Although people have ditficulty
■*‘^Dennis King, "Ecosystem Valuation: Contingent Valuation Method: Issues and Limitations of the Contin





thinking about the environment in monetary terms, trade-offs are inevitable in a world of
limited resources. Governments must be able to set priorities, and these priorities should
be informed by what the public considers to be important environmental concerns.
Another criticism of the contingent valuation method is that it fails to engage people
in a debate about what regulations should be funded. Simply answering questions on a
survey by selecting a dollar amount or circling yes or no does not facilitate the exchange of
well-reasoned arguments. Desjardins writes that it is important for people “to explain why
[they] value clean air and water and justify why [they] value the preservation of wilderness
Because humanity depends upon the environment, environmental policy decisions
should be determined through a political process involving deliberation among people who
are willing to pay different amounts. Spash writes that those who apply CBA can make the
mistake of “construing deliberation as a process of discovery, searching out wants, rather
than a process of reflecting upon what there is most reason to want.
Those who criticize basing a total benefits calculation on the results of contingent val
uation surveys assert that this approach treats people as mere consumers and ignores their
roles as citizens. Consumers want things for themselves and spend their money in such a
way as to satisfy their wants. Consumers desire things like Lite cereal for breakfast and
Downey soft toilet paper, and the money they spend on these products is an appropriate
of the benefits they derive from them. On the other hand, citizens have a broader





Joseph Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Belmont. Califor
nia: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 67.
Clive Spash, "How much is that ecosystem in the window?” Environmental Values. 17 (2008): 273
51)
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Critics contend that there are fundamental differences between an individual’s desire
for a hamburger to satisfy his hunger and an environmental goal for clean air that he shares
with other members of his community. Explaining the difference between these roles,
Spash writes, “We act as consumers to get what we want for ourselves. We act as citizens
to achieve what we think is right or best for the community.”^" For this reason, citizens
should decide what they are willing to pay through a democratic process that allows rea
sons for regulation to be articulated and defended. Sagoff writes that in contrast to pref
erences, which cannot be inherently right or wrong, beliefs can be false or unjustified.
The belief that society should be willing to pay  x dollars to meet an environmental goal
should, therefore, be argued in a public forum instead of being assessed through the results
of contingent valuation surveys.
Disputing the claim that preferences are strictly appetitive, CBA advocates point out
that consumers reflect on why they should want something before they form their pref-
A consumer’s beliefs inform his preferences, and the truth or falsity of those
beliefs is important to him. For example, an individual may desire a hamburger because
he believes eating a hamburger will mitigate his iron deficiency. If it turns out that eating
a hamburger will not address his iron deficiency in the slightest, the falsity of his belief is
relevant to his preference. If he discovers that his belief is false, he likely will be inclined
to change his preference. The consumer is able to explain his preference with reasons; this
suggests that consumers often decide upon their preferences through a deliberative process.
^"Clive Spash, "How much is that ecosystem in the window?” Environmental Values, 17 (2008): page
'‘Toseph Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Belmont, Califor
nia: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), page.
^■^Cass Sunstein. "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment.” of  Chicago Law School John M.




CBA advocates also challenge the binary concept that someone acts as either a con-
citizen. A person filling out a contingent valuation survey can be trusted to
both a consumer and a citizen even if the survey itself does not facilitate a
community-wide discussion. If even a small number of people in a community believe that




for it. Also, the news media offers people a wide variety of opportunities to enter
public discussion that takes in arguments for and against a proposed environmental
likely that these public discussions influence the way people respond to
contingent valuation surveys. Pointing out that CBA gives us a way of organizing informa
tion that is important to a public discussion, Schmidtz writes, “CBA done in public view




helps to give democracies a fighting chance to operate
as
’●>55erate.
ni.2 Problematic Feature of CBA: Incommensurable Values
CBA requires that decisions be made by a comparison of costs and benefits. In order for
all costs and all benefits to be taken into account, they must be translatable into a common
measuring unit. CBA advocates claim that all values can be expressed monetarily, however,
incommensurable with each other.critics of CBA disagree. Some values, they claim, are
Two values are incommensurable when they cannot be placed on a “common tooting by
"^David Schmidtz. ”On the Value and Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” in Environmental Ethics: Readwgsin
Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont, California. Thomson a swort
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usino a sinale metric such as money. Furthermore, when values are incommensurable,
there is no general way to correctly rank a value as better than or equal to another value,
incommensurability, David Wiggins writes that for two values A and B, A and
ommensurable “if there is no general way in which  A and B trade off in the whole




of choice and comparison in which they figure,
general better than or equal to a value for liberty. The belief in value
incommensurability leads some to the conclusion that CBA ignores or misrepresents any
non-economie values in the process of environmental valuation. CBA assumes the idea of
the view that there is only one value to which all other values are reducible.
range of situations
for love is not in
value monism -
Opposing this view, critics of CBA often identify with value pluralism the idea that there
reducible to each other. Converting all values to
decision about environmental regulation easily
facile solution that fails to represent what
are many distinct values, which are not
a single measure like money may make a
calculable, but critics believe that it presents a
people actually do when they make moral decisions.
According to value pluralists, CBA masks the reality that independent values conflict
and compete. In fact, an attempt to reduce one value to another is sometimes in direct
to convert his or her
A new
opposition to people’s moral instincts. For example, asking someone
value for honesty to a monetary value sounds like the beginnings of a bribe,
decision process, according to critics of CBA, should recognize a plurality of deeply felt
58
values and commitments, which require a suitable context and process for their articulation
Robert Frank, ”Why is Cost Benefit Analysis So Controversial?” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000);
'’^Nienhe Hsieh, "Incommensurable Values,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/valueincommensurable/.
Clive Spash. "How much is that ecosystem in the window?” Environmental Values, 17 (2008): 274
.S6
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and defense Critics of CBA hold that attentiveness to economic value should be an
of environmental valuation, but they maintain that it should be thought ofimportant part
as one value among others. Value pluralists call for a “multiple criteria decision process
that, unlike CBA, does not attempt to reduce cost and benefit considerations to one kind of
’●>60
value.
behind India’s recent launch of “the people’s car,” more notoriouslyThe controversy
known as the “world’s cheapest car,” illustrates the problem of incommensurable values.
With its fi rst commercial debut in March of 2009, the Tata Nano, priced at 100,000 rupees
($2500), offers India’s rising middle class the option of more convenient travel at an af
fordable price. Currently, most commuters travel by bicycle or motorbike, and only 7 m
1,000 people in India currently own cars. However, Tata Motors expects to sell 1,000,000
Nanos a year, which will increase India’s car market by 60%. The chairman of Tata motors,
Mr. Ratan Tata also has plans to market this car to Europeans and Americans who may be
61
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looking for a cheaper car in the wake of the recent economic downturn.
Although the Nano promises to help the poor, environmentalists are concerned that the
availability of a cheap car will lead to mass motorization, which will increase fuel demands
In a country with a63and contribute significantly to air pollution and greenhouse gases,
population exceeding one billion - most of whom have until now relied upon bicycles and
scooters for travel - the availability of a cheap car is expected to increase the number of
Clive Spash, "How much is that ecosystem in the window?" Environmental Values, 17 (2008): 275
^“Clive Spash. "How much is that ecosystem in the window?” Environmental Values, 17 (2008): 265
Ashling O’Connor, “Tata Nano - world's cheapest new car is unveiled in India," TimesOnline,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/driving/article3164205.ece.
^'-Nick Kurczewski, "How Tata Built the Nano for Less." The New York Times, April. 1.2009.
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.eom/2009/04/0 l/howtatabuiltthenanoforless/?ref=automobiles.
Ashling O’Connor, "Tata Nano - world’s cheapest new car is unveiled in India," The Times, January 1 1.
2008. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/driving/article3164205.ece.
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drivers by tens of millions. According to the Center for Science and Environment in Delhi,
more than half of India’s cities already have critical levels of air pollution. Environmental
ists argue that because car maintenance is an unlikely priority in the third world, the Nano
will become a huge source of pollution as catalytic converters break down and are not
replaced. This is an example of a negative externality an instance where there are conse
quences of an economic transaction between two parties that spill over to a third party. The
buying and selling of Tata Nanos does not only affect Tata Motors and the Nano purchasers;
the transaction has an impact on the wider community and the cities of India because each
vehicle contributes to air pollution. Furthermore, the transaction has an impact on the world
64
because each new vehicle adds to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
Elucidating the problem of value incommensurability, the Nano presents a moral dilemma
to those who care for human welfare and the environment. Because the Nano offers bicycle-
riders safer and more convenient transportation and improves access to employment oppor
tunities, the Nano finds support in the value for equality. However, environmental values
oppose the Nano because of the car’s expected contribution to air pollution and greenhouse
In this situation, value pluralists would argue that the values for equality and the
environment cannot be converted to common currency for use in a CBA. Instead, they say
that the values for equality and the environment compete with each other; for this reason,
they claim that a solution must be found by a valuation method that can accommodate a
gases.
plurality of values.
In answer to the incommensurability objection, CBA advocates point out that people




and do make decisions involving trade-offs even when multiple values are involved.
Robert Frank gives the following example to demonstrate that even seemingly incommen
surable values are commensurable with each other.
can
Few people would oppose a new technology that would reduce the cost of
power by half if its only negative effect were to degrade our view of the Grand
Canyon for just one 15-second interval each decade. By the same token, no one
would favor adoption of a technology that produced only a negligible reduction
in the cost of power at the expense of a dark cloud that continuously shielded
North America from the rays of the sun.
65
In Frank’s example, there are two values: economic value and aesthetic environmental
value. Because it is more useful to us to save billions of dollars on power than it is to save
fifteen seconds of Grand Canyon viewing, we make the trade-off to save money on power.
The common footing for these values is their utility. Similarly, saving a little money on
power is less useful to us than saving clear skies. Because we are able to put different
values on a common footing in these examples, it is true in at least some cases that we can
measure different values by the same standard. In  a world where scarcity is a fact of life,
we must make these comparisons in order to set priorities tor our limited resources.




To perform a CBA on a proposed environmental regulation, the analyst must calculate
the total potential benefits of the regulation by determining what people are willing to pay
to gain particular benefits. The WTP calculation may be based on market values - what
people actually pay or are paid for a good or on the results of contingent valuation surveys,
which attempt to approximate peoples individual WTPs. In either case, critics point out that
if a WTP is only a reflection of preferences people are willing to financially support, then
the correct policy decision must be the one that has the most financial backing, on these
grounds, critics claim that CBA cannot consistently guide us to moral policy decisions.
Desjardins writes that if financially supported preferences are determinative of policy deci
sions, “Those who are willing to pay the most, for all intents and purposes, have the right
view; theirs is the more informed opinion, the better aesthetic judgment, and the deeper
” 66
moral insight.
According to critics of CBA, the policy tool gives preferences weight based on how
strongly they are felt - expressed in the amount of money someone is willing to pay -
instead of giving preferences weight based on what the preferences are. Disagreeing with
this view of preferences, Desjardins writes, “A more realistic and honest assumption would
” 67
seem to be that whether what I want is a good thing depends on what it is that I want.
Even if someone is willing to pay millions so that a preference may be satisfied, the money
he is willing to pay is only an expression of how strongly he desires something and not a
Mark Sagoif. ”At the Shrine of our Lady of Fatima,” in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont. California; Thomson Wadsworth), 624-625.
Joseph Desjardins. Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Belmont. Calitor-




justification for that desire. Expressing his disapproval of the WTP criterion, Mark Sagoff
writes, “Economics can measure the intensity with which we hold our beliefs; it cannot
”68evaluate those beliefs on their merits.
Critics argue that relying on preferences is problematic because sometimes people want
things that do not promote their welfare and do not want things that do promote their wel-
fare.^''^ In fact, the satisfaction of many preferences is destructive to the preference-holder.
For example, many people have preferences for cocaine and are willing and able to pay
for a fix. Sometimes people form preferences with incomplete or inaccurate information.
For example, because people do not understand the holistic nature of ecosystems, they may
be willing to pay more for conservation projects for the giant panda than they would be
willing to pay for efforts aimed at conserving genetic diversity. Even though genetic di
versity is far more important to the goals of conservation than a single endangered species,
people are more familiar with pandas because they have seen pandas on television and at
the zoo; on the other hand, most people do not know what genetic diversity is, let alone
why it is important. Mark Sagoff points out that just as correct answers in mathematics
.: independent of peoples preferences, questions of environmental regulation should not
be decided by how much people are willing to pay. Sagoff writes, “No matter how much
Critics argue that for
are i
”70
people are willing to pay, three will never be the square root of six.
similar reasons, people’s willingness to pay for environmental benefits about which they
know little is an inappropriate basis for environmental policy decisions.
Joseph Desjardins, Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy (Belmont. Califor
nia: Thomson Wadsworth. 2006). 63.
Cass Sunstein. "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment," of Chicago Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): 28
Mark Sagoff, "At the Shrine of our Lady of Fatima," in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and
Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont, California: Thomson Wadsworth). 626.
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In answer to these objections, advocates of CBA assert that CBA is based on clas
sical utilitarianism, not preference utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism says that a
morally right action is one that results in the most preference satisfaction; in contrast, clas
sical utilitarianism holds that a morally right action is the one that optimizes utility.^* It
is consistent with classical utilitarianism to ignore the desires of someone who is mentally
incompetent or ignorant because the goal is to maximize utility, not to satisfy as many
preferences as possible. Cass Sunstein’- writes, “If peoples WTP reflects impulsiveness,
recklessness, an absence of information, or insufficient deliberation, then it is for other
Sunstein goes
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people, in government as elsewhere, to draw their attention to that fact,
on to say that a low WTP may in a small number of cases be overridden on the grounds
74that it is rooted in errors factual or otherwise.
Though CBA draws support from the political ideal of autonomy, CBA may also
nonautonomous decisions when the decision-maker is misinformed or incapable ofrespect
thinking rationally. The liberal ideal of autonomy allows for, at least in some formulations,
soft paternalism - the overturning of autonomous decisions that result from mental incom-
It is, after all, easy to imagine how basing policy decisions on the
preferences of people who are misinformed could promote disutility. Explaining this view
75
petence or ignorance.
of autonomy, Sunstein writes.
“The idea of autonomy requires not merely respect for whatever preferences
^'Walter Si nnott-Armstrong,“Consequentialism.”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http;//plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
^-CBA believer who President Obama picked to head the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Sunstein,
Cass Sunstein, "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment,” of Chicago Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): 28.





people happen to have, but also social conditions that allow preferences to be
developed in a way that does not reflect coercion or injustice. With respect to
’’76
some risks, the relevant preferences are nonautonomous.
Because the determination of WTP is flexible in this way, people’s destructive preferences
should not present an insurmountable barrier to effective valuation.
I1I.4 Distribution
Because cost-benefit analysis is a policy tool of anthropocentric utilitarianism, general ob
jections to utilitarianism are relevant to a discussion of CBA. Although the goal of utilitar
ianism is to maximize net utility, the ethical system does not favor one scheme of distribu
tion of utility over any other. In other words, a utility distribution scheme that made 2% of
the population exceedingly happy at the expense of 98% of the population is just as good
as a distribution scheme that equally deals out happiness to 100% of the population. Critics
of utilitarianism contend that the system should not be relied upon exclusively because it
does not provide for the realization of equality.
The distribution problem is further exacerbated by the calculation of benefits, which
are determined by figuring out how much people are willing to pay to gain something
good or avoid something bad. People’s willingness to pay is affected by their resources.
Rich people are willing to pay far more for benefits than poor people simply because they
have more money at their disposal. Poor people cannot be willing to pay more than what
Cass Sunstein, “Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment." A’ of Chicago Law School John M.
Olin Program in Law tfi Economics Working Papers! (2001): 28).
7<S
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they have; they may value an environmental good just as much as a rich person does but
have a lower WTP. For this reason, the rich are in a better position to have their utility
maximized. Critics of CBA say that CBA disproportionately favors the rich and that unless
the rich are willing to pay to protect the interests of the poor, CBA will favor the status quo
Utilitarian Henry Sidgwick attempted to address this
problem by proposing that equality should be used to ’’break ties.”^^ In other words, if two
distribution schemes maximized the same amount of net utility, then the one that promoted
equality more should be selected. It is important to note that utilitarians must go outside of
77
and perpetuate social inequality.
utilitarianism to find a solution to the distribution problem.
A distribution problem specifically concerning CBA deals with the uncertainty over
who should bear the costs and who should receive the benefits. It could be consistent with
outcome of CBA to adopt a policy decision that subjected the poor to terrible livingan
conditions that resulted in higher healthcare expenses to create wealth for the rich. Some
claim that indeed this happens. Critics claim that the application of CBA results in environ
mental racism - racial discrimination in the enforcement of environmental regulations and
79
They argue that as a result of CBA, the poor bearthe placement of polluting industries.
disproportionate environmental risks. Robert Bullard cites a number of studies showing
that poor or minority communities receive less protection from environmental risks than
affluent or white communities.
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Cass Sunstein, "Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment,”t//?/ver.sf7>' of Chicago Lmw School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): 9
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,“Consequentialism,”Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http.V/plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/
Robert Bullard, “Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decision Making," in Environmental Ethics: Read





According to Bullard, the distribution of poor people and minorities is correlated
with higher air pollution and more frequent instances of lead poisoning. Bullard writes,
“The current environmental protection paradigm has institutionalized unequal enforce
ment [and] traded human health for profit.”^® Explaining what he calls procedural inequity,
Bullard notes that environmental regulations are not enforced equally in poor communi
ties and affluent communities. In poor communities, the penalties for violating hazardous
waste laws are much lower than they are in affluent communities. The clean-up for haz
ardous waste sites is often delayed in poor or minority communities. When a hazardous
waste site is located near poor or minority neighborhoods, the area is more often walled
off than it is cleaned up through permanent treatment. Describing geographic inequity,
Bullard points out that communities located near environmental hazards like landfills, re
fineries, and toxic waste dumps are more often poor or minority communities,
writes that environmental justice requires the prevention of harm before it occurs and a
shift of the burden of proof to the polluting industries. Instead of requiring the individ
ual to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the activities of an industry and an
environmental harm, it should be the industry’s responsibility to prove that their actions
do not cause environmental harm.^“ Bullard writes, “Relying solely on proof of a cause-
and-effect relationship as defined disguises the exploitive way the polluting industries have
83
81 Bullard
operated in some communities and condones a passive acceptance of the status quo.
●'^‘’Robert Bullard. "Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decision Making,” in Environmental Ethics: Read
ings in Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont, California: Thomson
Wadsworth). 644.
Robert Bullard, "Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decision Making,” in Environmental Ethics: Read
ings in Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont, California: Thomson
Wadsworth), 652.
'^"We will revisit this idea in the following section on the Precautionary Principle.
Robert Bullard, "Overcoming Racism in Environmental Decision Making,” in Environmental Ethics: Read-
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CBA does not only raise questions over the distribution of costs and benefits. Crit¬
ics of CBA assert that in some cases if a certain proposed policy stands to greatly help the
poor, then the policy should be adopted even if the costs of doing so exceed the benefits.
Even if the poor are not willing to pay enough to justify regulation by CBAs standards,
84 In these cases, asome environmental risks are so high that they violate human rights,
low WTP should be ignored, and other people, the government, should step in to reduce to
the risk. For example, lead poisoning in children remains a serious problem in the United
States. Lead exposure to children under the age of six is very harmful because it is eas
ily absorbed, and it interferes with children’s development. There are several effects of
high blood lead levels that are irreversibly damaging to ones health: lead poisoning lowers
IQ, harms hearing, contributes to learning disabilities and hyperactivity, and stunts growth.
According to a 2005 report by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, poor chil
dren and children of minority groups are poisoned at higher rates than children of white
or affluent families.^^ About 310,000 children - 1.6% of children aged 1- 5 - have blood
lead levels (BLLs) that are dangerously high. Among African American children, 3.1%
of children aged 1- 5 have blood lead levels that are dangerously high, so African Amer
ican children are subject to a risk that is twice as great as that of the larger population
of children. Due to lead poisoning prevention programs, the mean BLLs in children has
dropped substantially in the past two decades. Lead poisoning in children is largely due to
/■//.?.V in Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont, California: Thomson
Wadsworth). 654
Cass Sunstein, ’Cost Benefit Analysis and the Environment,"University of Chicago Lmw School John M.
Olin Program in Law & Economics Working Papers! (2001): 26
National Center for Environmental Health — Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention Program — Gen Info





lead-based paint in older homes. Prevention programs aim to identify these environmental
hazards to make homes safe for children. Households in poor or minority communities
may have low WTPs that cause a CBA to recommend against a prevention program. How
ever, reducing racial and class disparities of environmental risk is important to promoting
equality. Even if the costs to society exceed the benefits, critics of CBA maintain that the
prevention program should be adopted because doing so promotes environmental justice.
In answer to the claim that poor neighborhoods are targeted by polluting industries,
David Schmidtz demonstrates that a random lottery to pick out a waste treatment facility
site could easily result in the non-random result of poor people living in the facility’s neigh
borhood.^^ He rhetorically asks whether selecting neighborhoods by random lottery would
be a more respectful process. He explains that if Beverley Hills were selected by random
lottery as the neighborhood for the waste treatment facility, the residents would either offer
some large sum of money to any neighborhood that would offer to take the waste treatment
facility or they would simply sell their homes. The people who would either accept a large
amount of money to take a waste treatment facility or buy homes in a neighborhood with a
waste treatment facility will most likely be poor. This is simply because middle class and
upper class people prefer homes in neighborhoods without eyesores and can afford to live
in these neighborhoods. Schmidtz writes, “One thing will never change: waste treatment
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facilities will tend to be found in poorer neighborhoods.
David Schmidtz. "On the Value and Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,” in Environmental Ethics: Readings in
Theory and Application, ed. Louis Pojman and Paul Pojman (Belmont. California: Thomson Wadsworth).
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III.5 The Precautionary Principle
A major objection to cost-benefit analysis is that we can never be sure that we have
taken all costs and benefits into account. Analysts using cost-benefit analysis for environ
mental decision-making presume to account for all costs and benefits and accurately weigh
them according to their likelihood of occurrence; however, many critics of CBA point out
that we can never fully know the costs and benefits of many activities and that we are often
uncertain of the probabilities of incurring particular costs and reaping particular benefits.
Believing that we need a tool that will appropriately guide us when we are uncertain about
the full environmental impact of an action, many critics of CBA believe that the Precau
tionary Principle is a better tool for environmental decision-making. The Precautionary
Principle has many different formulations but the general idea is that if there is an envi
ronmental threat of a serious enough nature that is believed to be a possible consequence
of an activity, then that activity should be regulated, temporarily prohibited, or banned. A
famous statement of faith in the Precautionary Principle comes to us from the 1992 Rio
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development:
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of se
rious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used
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The Precautionary Principle, in contrast to CBA, does not require that we use science to
establish whether a serious environmental threat is a probable consequence of an activity.
Even if science does not demonstrate a causal relationship between an activity and an en
vironmental effect, the Precautionary Principle simply calls for regulation of the activity if
the believed potential effect, which many only be  a guess, is threatening enough. In contrast
to the Precautionary Principle, CBA guides decisions by what is known to make sensible
trade-offs instead of giving the benefit of the doubt to unknown effects. If causality is not
established between an activity and an effect, the cost of the effect does not factor into the
accounting of costs and benefits. However, according to the Wingspread Statement on the
Precautionary Principle, causality does not have to be proven, for it says:
“Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health,
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relation
ships are not fully established scientifically.
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Furthermore, even if causality is established, the probability of an effects occurrence no
matter how small is irrelevant to the application of the Precautionary Principle. So, theo
retically, if there is a one in one quadrillion chance that an activity will lead to the extinction
of nearly all the world’s fish, then we should, as a precaution, ban the activity. Proponents
of the Precautionary Principle call for its application when a believed potential effect is
“harmful to humans, catastrophic, irreversible, such as to result in the loss ot something
irreplaceable, such as to reduce or eliminate biodiversity, or such as to violate the rights
Instead of requiring government agencies to produce
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of members of future generations.
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Wingspread Statement on the Precautionaiy Principle, Janunary 1998,
http://www.gdrc.org/ugov/precaution3.html
Neil Manson.“Formulating the Precautionary Principle.” Environmental Ethics 24 (2002): 266.
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evidence of harm, the burden of proof is shifted to the industry that would be performing a
particular activity to show evidence of safety. This sometimes entails proving that there is
zero risk of any significant environmental damage following from a particular activity.
To better understand how the precautionary principle impacts policy decisions,
can consider, as examples, how it has been employed in several European countries to block
and place restrictions on products of agricultural biotechnology. Greatly suspicious of
genetically modified foods and crops, Austria has used the precautionary principle to block
the cultivation of MON810 maize - the only genetically modified crop that is approved
for cultivation in the EU. Austria has deemed it appropriate to ban the cultivation of this
insect-resistant crop because of the possibility that pest insects will become resistant, which
may require the use of stronger chemical pesticides. Austria has also banned herbicide-
tolerant plants even though it is established that this would benefit agriculture because
there is concern that a possible increase in herbicide use may result. Even though there is
no scientific evidence to show that using herbicide-tolerant plants will bring about greater
herbicide use, the precautionary principle calls for heightened regulation simply because
people perceive an environmental threat. This perception is largely due to irrational public
fears, superstitions, and misunderstandings about gm crops; in this way, the precautionary
principle is used as a political tool to appease the public. The basis of the decision to
heavily regulate does not have to be scientifically sound because it is up to the industry to
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Though advocates of the precautionary principle believe that regulating in the ab¬
sence of knowledge offers better environmental protection than CBA, it quickly becomes
clear that the precautionary principle could be used to rule out any course of action. In
effect, the precautionary principle only serves to reflect public fears and biases against one
course of action; government agencies applying the precautionary principle fail to real
ize that all courses of action, which includes taking no action, have risks associated with
them. In this way, the precautionary principle is ’’paralyzing” ”̂ because the tool cannot
recommend anything. Asserting this point, Sunstein writes that the precautionary principle
’’stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in between.
Offering examples to show how consistent application of the precautionary princi
ple is disabling to government agencies, Sunstein refers to the reduction in the regulatory
ceiling of arsenic levels that occurred in the first years of the Bush administration,
worst-case scenario, a 50 ppb arsenic regulatory ceiling would have resulted in 100 lives
lost per year, but a 10 ppb regulatory ceiling - costing over 200 million dollars per year
- could save as few as six lives annually. Not only is it unclear that the benefits will be
worthwhile in light of the cost of the regulation; the precautionary principle, if applied to
all course of action being considered, cannot recommend regulation. Because stronger reg
ulation will cause a great increase in the cost of water for households in rural communities,
there is concern that people in those communities will resort to using well water, which is
'^-Sunstein. Cass. “Beyond the Precautionary Principle." University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin
Program in Law & Economics Working Papers 2 (2003): 21
Sunstein, Cass. “Beyond the Precautionary Principle." University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin
Program in Law & Economics Working Papers 2 (2003): 21
This was discussed earlier as an example of CBA because a CBA was formally performed to evaluate
possible courses of action; however, the ultimate decision upon a 10 ppb regulatory ceiling was influenced
by the precautionary principle because the analysis took into account the cost of the unknown effects ot





often very polluted. It is not the case that there are possible deaths associated only with
option; all options have serious potential risks.
Applying the precautionary principle not only ignores the potential risks of regula
tion, it also ignores the potential benefits of nonregulation - otherwise known as opportunity
benefits. In many situations, there is a possibility that fewer deaths will result under less
stringent regulation; however, the precautionary principle only considers potential prob
lems that might result from nonregulation. Sunstein offers the example of drugs being
tested before being released to the public.^^ If the process of FDA approval is very strict,
more people will likely die because they lack access to life-saving drugs that are still being
tested. Similarly, strong restrictions against the cultivation of genetically modified crops
has the potential to result in more deaths because the potential benefit of alleviating world
hunger with the cultivation of gm crops will be lost. If the goal is to use precaution, neither
stricter nor more lenient regulations can be recommended. However, those who apply the
precautionary principle do not confront this reality because they place the burden of proof
on industry to establish with certainty that environmental harm will not result from a par
ticular activity. There is no burden of proof placed on any group to show that opportunity
benefits with the potential to save many lives will not be lost.
Though advocates of the precautionary principle criticize CBA for weighing costs
and benefits in the face of uncertainty, it is clear that those who apply the precautionary
principle are in more trouble. Every option has its own risks. If those who apply the pre
cautionary principle choose to believe that only the potential harms of nonregulation are
Sunstein, Cass. “Beyond the Precautionary Principle.” University of Chicago Law School John M. Olin




relevant to policy decisions, they are selectively sensitive to potential harms, for it is clear
from the examples vve considered that more harm can result from more stringent regula
tion. Instead of relying on unfounded public biases against particular courses of action, the
results of CBA are grounded in knowledge, and the goal is to make the best policy decision
with the information known. For these reasons, CBA is feasible as a policy tool. On the
other hand, the Precautionary Principle is not feasible as a policy tool because, if consis
tently applied, it would not be able to recommend any course of action. In this way, the
Precautionary Principle is less protective of the environment than CBA.
III.6 The Land Ethic
As we have established earlier, CBA is a policy tool of anthropocentric utilitarianism -
ethical system that calls for the maximization of utility for humans in making decisions
of environmental policy. Many people oppose this approach to environmental decision
making. Proponents of nonanthropocentric deontological environmental ethics believe that
nature has intrinsic value and, therefore, has a right to be protected. In contrast to anthro
pocentric utilitarianism, which holds that nonhuman life can only hold instrumental value,
nonanthropocentric deontological environmental ethics maintain that nonhuman life should
be treated as ends in themselves. According to this position, CBA is inadequate as a tool for
environmental protection because following CBA violates the rights of nonhuman life. One
prominent nonanthropocentric deontological environmental ethic is the land ethic, which
is also known as ecocentrism. The land ethic calls for a change in the way people think
about their relationship to the environment. In order to protect the environment, humans.
an
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according to this view, must realize that they are one species among many; they must relin
quish the role of conqueror and assume the role of member. This call requires humans to
consider human concerns as no more important than concerns to any other species.
The land ethic was first developed by environmental thinker Aldo Leopold who
worked for the U.S. Forest Service before becoming a professor of Wildlife Management
at the University of Wisconsin. In his influential book A Sand County Almanac, Leopold
lays the groundwork for the land ethic. Leopold begins with the claim that ethics arose
as an evolutionary adaptation that began by affecting relations between individuals and
later shaped relations between the individual and society. Leopold asserts that ethics has
not evolved to adequately govern humanity’s relationship to the biotic community - an
ethic that broadens humanity’s moral concern to include the land and all nonhuman life.
Leopold asserts that
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Describing ethics as a ’’kind of community instinct in the making,
humanity needs an ethic that will enlarge the boundaries of the community to include the
land. Because we presently lack this community instinct, Leopold sets forth a defense of
the land ethic. The complexity, stability, and orderliness of nature, to Leopold, suggests that
it is intrinsically good and should be protected. Leopold believes that if ecological science
is studied by everyone, people will grow to love, admire, and respect the environment,
and they will understand the importance of preseiwing it. A love for nature, according to
Leopold, will lead people to put an end to man-made environmental destruction,
way, the science of ecology, to Leopold, serves as a bridge between descriptive facts and
97 In this
normative judgments about the environment.
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Leopold is critical of tools of economic analysis such as CBA because, he claims.
most of wildlife has no economic value and, therefore, stands little chance of being pro¬
tected/^^ As people learn ecology, Leopold believes they will have a deep appreciation for
value in the environment, but this value, according to Leopold is not value in an economic
m99
sense but value in a ’’philosophical sense.
Providing a land ethic principle to guide environmental decision-making, Leopold
writes, ”A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
This view is known as’’100the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise,
ironmental holism - the idea that the center of value for an environmental ethic shouldenv
be environmental wholes such as species and ecosystems. This ethic differs from other
nonanthropocentric deontological ethics, which hold that the center of value should be the
individual life. According to the land ethic, individuals should be sacrificed if that is what
it takes to preserve the whole species or the whole ecosystem. For example, the land ethic
mandates that the population of deer in an area should be kept under control so that the
deer do not eat all of the vegetation and starve themselves or other animals. Land ethic
proponent, J. Baird Callicott explains this judgment as he writes, ”It would be wrong for
the federal fish and wildlife agency, in the interest of individual animal welfare, to permit
populations of deer, rabbits, feral burros, or whatever to increase unchecked.
The idea of environmental holism fits in neatly with Leopold’s conception of the
This objection is covered in the subsection on value incommensurability.
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importance of man's understanding that he is part of a community. Leopold makes it clear
that humans must see themselves as members of a larger biotic community in order to
prevent environmental degradation; Leopold writes, ”A land ethic changes the role of Homo
sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies
respect for his fellow members, and also respect for the community as such,
is radically different from an anthropocentric ethic, which places humanity at the center of
»»I02 This view
environmental concern.
Advocates of anthropocentric utilitarianism and CBA point out several flaws in the
reasoning of the land ethic. Leopold believes that he can derive normative claims from
the facts of ecological science; however, this is wrongheaded. Deriving environmental
values from environmental statements of fact epitomizes the naturalistic fallacy. The land
ethic says that we should admire, respect, and protect environmental wholes but gives no
for doing this other than the fact of a species’ or ecosystem’s existence. There
is no foundation to Leopold’s claim that an action’s rightness is determined by whether
it preserves the integrity and stability of the biotic community. The science of ecology is
useful for describing how nature is interconnected. It is, furthermore, beneficial to CBA
because it establishes that certain states of the environment are costly to humans. However,
this does not mean that the science of ecology can provide us with an environmental ethic.
Demonstrating this problematic feature of the land ethic, Desjardins gives an example of a
field whose biota composition changes from grasses to shrubs to pine forests to oak forests
The confusion
Aldo Leopold. ’'Ecocentrism: The Land Ethic, " in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Appli
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created by this reasoning weakens the land ethic’s prescriptive ability; for this reason, CBA
presents a more action-guiding means of protecting the environment.
The land ethic’s emphasis on environmental holism draws another important objec
tion. If humans are only members of the biotic community and human concerns should be
considered no more important than any other species’ concerns, the land ethic, if consis
tently applied, would demand the killing of humans to protect the integrity of other species.
Appalled at this implication of the land ethic, some critics have called this view environ
mental fascism. This problem presents a homed dilemma to proponents of the land ethic:
if humans are plain members, the land ethic requires us to violate human rights to preserve
the integrity and stability of nature; but if humans are more than plain members, the land
ethic is self-contradictory.
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IV ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
After a careful consideration of arguments in favor of and arguments opposing CBA, we
can now evaluate the appropriateness of CBA as a policy tool for environmental decision
making. CBA clearly has several advantages: it is effective at guiding the allocation of
limited resources, it is grounded in science, and it respects the autonomy of individuals
by not requiring people to spend more on regulation than they are willing to pay. These
features of CBA are helpful to government agencies that aim to make environmental policy
decisions that are prudent, nonarbitrary, and fair.
We also surveyed a variety of objections to CBA. Some of these objections cen
tered on problematic features of CBA such as its employment of the contingent valuation
method, its comparison of incommensurable values, and its roots in utilitarianism. These
objections do not take issue with CBA’s anthropocentrism; in other words, those who make
these objections agree with advocates of CBA that the goal of environmental protection is
to protect environmental goods for humans. The use of the contingent valuation method
weakens CBA’s ability to guide us in actions that protect the environment because the ben
efits of noneconomic environmental goods are determined by asking people hypothetical
questions about how much they would be willing to pay to set environmental protections in
place. It is well established that people are bad at estimating, so there is little assurance that
this method successfully approximates a market value for an environmental good. How
ever, this may be the best method we have to represent costs and benefits associated with
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noneconomic environmental goods. The incommensurability objection does not present
a signirtcant challenge to CBA because people do frequently make trade-offs that involve
considerations of different values, and they do so in a predictable way. Assigning economic
value to the benefit of reducing a risk of damage to a species or an ecosystem is simply a
tool for prioritizing the protection of environmental goods. Under objections to CBA’s util¬
itarian roots, the argument that points out that people have destructive preferences is easily
defended by making a distinction between classical and preference utilitarianism. How¬
ever, the distribution objection brings to our attention some serious problems with CBA.
Because CBA is a tool of anthropocentric utilitarianism and all distribution schemes are
equally valid under utilitarianism, the application of CBA alone to environmental problems
cannot provide us with a way to promote equality, which is a concern of government agen
cies that are charged with making environmental decisions. Sometimes a low WTP should
be disregarded if it results from the respondent’s poverty. Also, if two courses of action
are being considered and they both pass CBA’s inspection but one of them has a greater
difference between benefits and costs and the other promotes equality, anthropocentric util¬
itarianism cannot sufficiently guide us in which one we should choose.
Other objections to CBA that we considered proposed alternative approaches to
environmental decision-making. Though advocates of the Precautionary Principle claim
that CBA is misguided because costs are never fully known, it is clear that possible costs
and benehts exist for every option. If the precautionary principle is committed to restricting
all options that have possible, serious consequences, it is incapable of recommending any
activity; to use the words of Cass Sunstein, it is paralyzing. Another alternative approach
is the land ethic—a nonanthropocentric deontological environmental ethic that asserts that
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all environmental wholes have a right to continued existence and calls humans to view
themselves as members of a biotic community, as opposed to conquerors of nature. Because
this ethic commits the naturalistic fallacy, its claim that it is right to preserve the beauty and
integrity of the biotic community has no reasoned support. Furthermore, strict adherence
to the land ethic would require that we violate human rights to keep the human population
in check. Because of these problems, both of these alternatives are much less successful
than CBA is at offering guidance in environmental protection.
From an analysis of arguments for and against CBA, it is clear that the policy tool
is appropriate for informing environmental decision-making. However, anthropocentric
utilitarianism cannot by itself guide us in selecting one distributional scheme over any
other. Therefore, making environmental policy decisions often requires us to step outside
anthropocentric utilitarianism to find a justification for a particular course of action. This
suggests that though CBA is extremely helpful in that it gives us a way to set priorities
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